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Abstract. Public infrastructure investment includes the building of roads, ports, schools, 
hospitals, etc. It has been recognized important for economic growth, but the aspects related to the 
impacts of public infrastructure investment coupled with taxation on macroeconomic indicators 
and cost redistribution over time have been neglected in literature. This paper aims to discuss them 
analyzing as case study  the  public investment for transport infrastructure in the EU.                      
A computable general equilibrium  (CGE) model, called GTAP-CTI, has been applied to include 
the predicted variations in the public investment expenditure. Two sets of scenarios have been 
simulated. The first set compares the application of consumption and income taxation to face the 
increase of the public investment expenditure. The second set of scenarios compares the 
application of taxation in 2010 and 2050 facing the question of redistribution over time of the 
public investment expenditure. The framework employed in the paper is highly specialized and the 
results may not hold generally, but they mark two policy recommendations. Firstly, the choice of 
the tax instrument matters to avoid the crowding out effect on private expenditure. Secondly, 
consumption taxation is better than income taxation. At international level, there are gains in terms 
of trade, but global welfare decreases. 
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1. Introduction 
Public investment in infrastructure has been recognized important for economic 
growth. Over the last twenty years different studies have faced the debate on the 
relationship between public investment and economic growth (e.g. Barro (1991), 
Banister (2001)). Their common finding is that public investment promotes 
economic growth at regional and local levels. 
Initially, empirical studies on this literature have typically used an econometric 
approach (e.g. Ford and Poret (1991), Gramlich (1994)). Furthermore, several 
studies have attempted to take into account the impact of public investment using 
a computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach. For example, Jung and 
Thorbecke (2003) suggest that increasing investment in education must be 
coupled with policies that enhance the demand for labor through an appropriate 
pattern of economic growth. Rioja (2001) and Seung et al. (2001) show that more 
infrastructure investment may reduce welfare. More recently, Atolia (2008) shows 
that when stricter enforcement is used as a tool to raise revenue for public 
investment, the positive impact on growth from increased public investment is 
tempered by the negative general equilibrium effect on private capital 
accumulation. Berrittella (2009) shows that public investment on one country 
affects negatively on economic growth of the other countries. 
An important concern that has not been appropriately analysed in the literature 
on CGE modelling is the redistribution effect over time of public infrastructure 
investment in different tax structures. Since the important result due to Atkinson 
and Stiglitz (1976), the literature on the design of tax structure has significantly 
growing (e.g. Christiansen (1984), Boadway et al. (1994),  Naito (1999), Cremer 
et al. (2001), Saez (2004), Kaplow (2006)). However, these studies are mainly 
theoretical and have been concentrated on partial equilibrium analysis. Adam and 
Bevan (2006) compare various infrastructure investment funded with different 
fiscal tools using a CGE approach, but they do not face the distributive effects 
over time. Forni et al. (2009) discuss the general equilibrium effects of fiscal 
policy  in the Euro area, but they restrict their analysis to a closed economy setup 
and to indirect taxation. 
In this context, the analysis in this paper is novel in two aspects. Firstly, the 
paper aims to discuss the general equilibrium feedback effects in short and long 
run of increasing public infrastructure investment with different tax structures.     
In more details, the experiments have been split in two sets. The first set compares 
the application of consumption and income taxation to face the increase of the 
public investment expenditure. The second set of scenarios compares the 
application of taxation in 2010 and 2050 facing the question of redistribution over 
time of the public investment spending. A computable general equilibrium  (CGE) 
model, called GTAP-CTI, has been applied to include the predicted variations in 
the public investment expenditure. Secondly, the contribution is empirical. The 
public investment planned in the Trans-European Transport (TEN-T) network for 
transport infrastructure has been taken as case study, which refers to already 
decided infrastructure investments or budget allocations, as provided by the 
experts from national ministries in the European Union (Planco Consulting, 
2003).  
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The framework employed in the paper is highly specialized and the results may 
not hold generally, but they imply two marked policy recommendations. Firstly, 
the choice of the tax instrument matters to avoid the crowding out effect on 
private expenditure. Secondly, consumption taxation is better than income 
taxation. At international level, there are gains in terms of trade, but global 
welfare decreases. 
 
2. Modeling framework  
In order to assess the systematic general equilibrium effects of public investment 
and taxation, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, called GTAP-CTI, 
has been applied. It has been developed by Berrittella (2009) to include the 
variation in the public investment expenditure. GTAP-CTI is a refinement of the 
GTAP model, that is a comparative static, multi-commodity, multi-region CGE 
model with the assumptions of perfect competition and market equilibrium.     
Hertel (1997) and Adams (2005) report a detailed description of the GTAP model 
and on the interpretation of results from CGE simulations.  
CGE models build upon general equilibrium theory, that combines behavioural 
assumptions on rational economic agents with the analysis of equilibrium 
conditions. To analyze the impact of change in government policy, the CGE 
modellers use the comparative methodology. Initially, the model is developed 
such that its equilibrium replicates the transactions observed in the data. This 
procedure, called calibration, refers to the estimation of structural parameters of 
the model, based on available information on prices and quantities, normally, 
obtained from a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). Moreover, the policy change is 
simulated by altering the relevant parameters and calculating the new equilibrium. 
The main virtue of the CGE approach is its comprehensive micro-consistent 
representation of price-dependent market interactions. The simultaneous 
explanation of the origin and spending of the agents' income makes it possible to 
address both economy-wide efficiency, as well as distributional policy impacts. 
Since the first CGE application by Johansen (1960),  CGE models have been 
widely employed by various national and international organizations (IMF, World 
Bank, OECD, etc.), the European Commission, research institutions and 
universities. For survey articles on CGE analysis see Shoven and Whalley (1992). 
GTAP-CTI model has been applied by aggregating the world economy from 87 
into 16 regions, with each representing either a single country, or a composite 
region of several countries (Table 1). Each region’s economy is further divided 
into 17 industries or commodity groups with emphasis on agriculture products, 
energy products and related sectors (Table 2).  
Commonly to the standard GTAP model, industries are modelled through  
representative firms minimizing costs and taking prices as given. The production 
functions are specified via a series of nested constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) functions (Figure 1): 
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where yi is the production of the good i, xj is the input j, θj is a non-negative 
parameter with ∑ =j j 1θ , σ is the elasticity of substitution. 
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Table 1. Regional aggregation 
Acronym Region Countries  
USA  United States of America 
United States of America 
CAN  Canada Canada 
EU-15 and EFTA  
 
 
 
 
Western Europe Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom 
JPK  Japan and Korea Japan, Korea 
ANZ  Australia and New Zealand 
Australia, New Zealand 
EU-12 
 
 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithunia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia 
FSU  Former Soviet Union Former Soviet Union 
MDE  Middle East Turkey, Rest of Middle East 
CAM  Central America Mexico, Central America, Carribean,  
SAM  
South America Colombia, Perù, Venezuela, Rest of Andean Pact, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Rest of South 
America 
SEA  Southeast Asia Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
CHI  China plus  China, Hong Kong 
ROW  Rest of world Small Island States 
SAS  South Asia Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Rest of South Asia 
NAF  North Africa Morocco, Rest of North Africa 
SSA  Sub-Saharan Africa 
Botswana, Rest of SACU, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbawe, Other Southern Africa, 
Uganda, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 
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Table 2. Industry aggregation 
Acronym Industry Sectors 
Rice Rice Paddy rice 
Wheat Wheat Wheat 
CerCrops Cereals and Crops Cereal grains, crops 
VegFruits Vegetables and Fruits Vegetables, fruit, nuts, oil seeds, sugar cane and beet, plant-
based fibers  
Animals Animals Cattle, sheep, goats, horses, animal products 
Forestry Forestry Forestry 
Fishing Fishing Fishing 
Coal Coal Coal 
Oil Oil Oil 
Gas  Gas Gas, gas manufacture and distribution 
Oil_Pcts Oil Products Petroleum, coal products 
Electricity Electricity Electricity 
Water Water distribution services Water distribution services 
En_Int_Ind Energy Intensive Industries Minerals, chemical, rubber, plastic products, mineral products, ferrous metals, metals 
Oth_Ind Other Industries 
 
 
 
 
 
Raw milk, wool, silk-worm cocoons, meat, vegetable oils and 
fat, dairy products, processed rice, sugar, food products, 
beverages and tobacco products, textiles, wearing apparel, 
leather products, wood products, paper products, publishing, 
metals products, motor vehicles and parts, transport 
equipment, electronic equipment, machinery, manufactures  
Mserv 
Market Services 
Construction, trade, surface transport, sea transport, air 
transport, communication, financial services, insurance, 
business services, dwellings,  recreation and other services 
NMServ Non-market Services Public administration, defence, health and education 
 
 
Each primary factor (Labor, Capital, Land and Natural Resources) is supplied to 
industries from its fixed regional endowment. Labor and capital are perfectly 
mobile endowments earning the same market return. Land and natural resources 
are sluggish endowments to adjust and, hence, they sustain differential returns in 
equilibrium. Domestic and foreign inputs are not perfect substitutes, according to 
the so called “Armington assumption”, which accounts for product heterogeneity 
(Armington, 1996).  
A representative household receives income, which is used to finance three 
classes of expenditure: private consumption, public consumption and savings.   
Her utility function is specified by a Cobb-Douglas structure (Figure 2). 
Furthermore, a constant-difference-elasticity (CDE) utility function is used for 
determining private consumption. Public consumption is determined by the 
maximization of a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Both public and private 
demands are split in a series of alternative composite Armington aggregates. 
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Figure 1 –Nested tree structure for industrial production process 
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Figure 2- Nested tree structure for final demand 
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In the standard GTAP framework, regional investment, REGINV(r) is an 
endogenous variable. Also, regional savings, SAVE(r), and investment are not 
equalized domestically, but only at the global scale. In more details, there is a 
composite investment good (GLOBINV), based on a portfolio of net regional 
investment (gross investment less depreciation), and offered to regional 
households to satisfy their savings demand such that: 
 
∑∑
∈∈
==
REGrREGr
rSAVEGLOBINVrREGINV )()(                                                    (2) 
 
All savers face a common price for the savings commodity (PSAVE). Investors 
behave in such a way that changes in regional rates of return are equalized across 
regions: 
 
( ) rorgrrore =                                                                                                        (3) 
 
where rore(r) is the percentage change in region’s rate of return and rorg is the 
percentage change in global rate of return. 
The percentage change in global supply of new capital goods (globalcgds) is 
computed as follows: 
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where qcgds and kb are, respectively, the percentage change of capital goods 
demand and beginning-of-period capital stock, in region r, and VDEP is the value 
of capital depreciation in r.   
If (1) all other markets are in equilibrium, (2) all firms earn zero profits and (3) 
all households are on their budget constraint, then global investment must equal 
global savings by Walras’law.  
In GTAP-CTI, investment has been fixed exogenously for the EU-15 and EFTA 
countries augmenting the calibration value by the percentage change, which 
accounts for the specific additional investment expenditure planned in the TEN-T 
network. In more details, the following two equations must be satisfied to obtain 
the equilibrium for capital goods demand : 
 
rrqorqcgds ∀= )()(                                                                                            (5) 
 
)15()15( EFTAandEUinvestmentEFTAandEUqcgds −=−                          (6) 
 
where qo(r) is the percentage change of capital goods output in region r. 
Furthermore, to ensure the equalization of global savings and investment, an 
endogenous adjustment of regional saving,  qsave(r), has been set up assuming 
that all regional investments increase by the same percentage: 
 
jijqsaveiqsave ≠∀= )()(                                                                         (7) 
 
In this way, the assumption of perfect international mobility of capital is 
respected.  
 
8 
3. Experiment design and data 
Public investment in the EU related to transport infrastructure as planned by the 
TEN-T network, includes the construction of four lines: (i) North-South line; (ii) 
Betuwe line; (iii) France-Italy line; (iv) East European line. The expected public 
investment spending is almost $ 50,000 Millions1. The expected social benefits 
are mainly reduction of the journey times and pollution, increase of road safety 
and infrastructure capacity. 
As this public investment is planned to end by 2010, the approach is based on a 
two-stage procedure. Firstly, counterfactual equilibria of the world economy are 
generated by “pseudo-calibration” from 1997 to 2010. This entails changing the 
initial calibration data in the model to forecasted values of some key economic 
variables for 2010. The calibration data comes from the GTAP database, version 
5, that contains the 1997 world economy data. The forecasted values for 2010 
include estimates of population growth, endowments change of labour, capital and 
natural resources, productivity change of labour and land (Table 3). The resulting 
scenario is called “benchmark”2.  
Subsequently, conventional comparative analysis is conducted simulating five 
scenarios for EU-15 and EFTA countries (Table 4): (i) investment in 2010 
(Scenario 1); (ii) investment and income taxation in 2010 (Scenario 2); (iii) 
investment in 2010 and income taxation in 2050 (Scenario 3); (iv) investment and 
private consumption taxation in 2010 (Scenario 4); (v) investment in 2010 and 
consumption taxation in 2050 (Scenario 5). 
The exogenous change of investment in country r induced by the variation in 
investment has been computed as follows:  
100×=
b
Tr
I
Iµ                                                                                                          (8)                                                                                            
where ITr and Ib are, respectively, investment for transport infrastructure and total 
investment in the EU-15 and EFTA countries. Moreover, the value of ITr is the 
planned investment in the TEN-T network programme. The value on denominator 
is obtained from the benchmark scenario, and it is equal to the sum of the 
domestic and foreign investment demand.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Investment is expressed in euros in the TEN-T network programme, whereas GTAP database is 
in dollars. Euro values have been converted into dollars employing an exchange rate of euro 
1:1.4819 dollars, that is the average exchange rate in 2008. See Planco Consulting (2003) for more 
details on combined transport investment in Western Europe. 
2
 These estimate values have been widely used for analyzing climate change impacts (Berrittella et 
al., 2006) and sustainability (Zhang et al., 2007). 
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Table 3. Estimates (% change from 1997 to 2010) 
Region Population 
growth  
(%) 
Capital 
stock 
change 
(%) 
Labour 
stock 
change 
(%) 
 Labour 
productivity 
change  
(%) 
  Land 
productivity 
change  
(%) 
    Agr1 Ene2 Elec3 Others4  
USA  11.29 42.19 35.74 23.18 0 14.95 29.52 78.24 
CAN  9.99 32.47 40.69 26.17 2.35 29.09 29.09 135.5 
EU-15 and EFTA  1.11 22.79 39.92 27.64 3.63 19.12 32.24 44.66 
JPK  -0.9 53.68 20.17 26.06 0 17.64 29.86 106.41 
ANZ  10.38 32.15 40.69 25.91 2.32 28.80 28.80 135.5 
EU-12 -2.27 33.08 34.83 45.35 18.45 35.80 45.35 117.7 
FSU  -2.26 35.03 34.83 48.03 19.54 37.92 48.03 117.7 
MDE  31.85 51.82 72.47 56.17 26.78 45.73 51.65 203.93 
CAM  21.79 37.51 74.04 57.79 27.55 47.04 64.14 203.93 
SAM  18.73 41.10 74.04 63.32 30.19 51.55 70.29 203.93 
SEA  22.89 52.29 42.32 62.42 29.76 50.82 69.02 206.25 
CHI  20.27 33.64 74.04 51.83 24.71 42.20 57.53 203.93 
ROW  11.85 45.39 42.32 54.19 25.84 44.12 59.92 206.25 
SAS  30.53 28.12 74.04 43.32 20.65 35.27 48.09 203.93 
NAF  36.23 37.56 74.04 57.87 27.59 47.11 64.24 203.93 
SSA  17.25 42.16 74.04 64.95 30.96 52.87 72.09 203.93 
1Agr includes Rice, Wheat, CerCrops, VegFruits, Animals, Forestry, Fishing. 2Ene includes 
Coal, Oil, Gas, Oil_Pcts, En_Int_Ind. 3Elec includes electricity. 4 Others includes Water, 
Oth_Ind, MServ, NMServ. 
        
 
 
Table 4. Experiment design  (percent change from benchmark scenario) 
Scenarios % 
Scenario 1  
Investment change in 2010 2.564 
Scenario 2  
Investment  change in 2010 2.564 
Change in share of private consumption taxation on income in 2010 0.008 
Scenario 3  
Investment change in 2010 2.564 
Change in share of private consumption taxation on income in 2050* 0.024 
Scenario 4  
Investment change in 2010 2.564 
Change in share of income taxation on income in 2010 0.005 
Scenario 5  
Investment change  in 2010 2.564 
Change in share of income taxation on income in 2050* 0.016 
* Discount rate 3%. 
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Any additional public investment is financed by raising, exogenously, taxes. In 
particular, for direct tax scenarios (Scenario 2 and 3), the share of income tax on 
income has been exogenously set. Moreover, in the short run, that is 2010, labour 
supply is assumed to be exogenous and individuals cannot change it.  In the    
long-run, that is in 2050, labour supply is assumed to be endogenous. This is a 
realistic assumption, because individuals choose their supply on the relative    
after-tax rewards. For indirect taxation scenarios (Scenario 4 and 5), the share of 
private consumption tax on income has been exogenously set. The choice to tax 
only private consumption finds reason in the fact that the users of the four lines 
will be mainly private rather than public users.  
If taxation is applied in 2010, the investment and taxation are faced by the same 
generation. Introduction of taxation in 2050 allows for analyzing intergenerational 
redistribution. In fact, if I assume that in 2010 and 2050 live two different 
generations, respectively, current and future generation, Scenario 3 and 5 imply 
that in 2010 the current generation has the benefits of the public investment, in 
2050 the future generation sustains the investment cost, paid by taxation. 
 
4. Simulation results 
 
This section presents the short and long run effects on key macroeconomic 
indicators and redistribution over time due to the additional public investment for 
transport infrastructure, financed by taxation, in the EU-15 and EFTA countries. 
Table 5 reports the results in terms of GDP, employment, private and public 
expenditure for the EU-15 and EFTA countries. In scenario 1 and 2, the effects of 
additional investment on GDP are positive However, in Scenario 3, 4 and 5 the 
effects on GDP of investment coupled with taxation become negative; 
particularly, in the income taxation scenarios (Scenario 4 and 5), the negative 
effects on GDP significantly increase. By assumption, in scenario 5, labour 
supply is endogenous and the result on employment shows that the household 
reduces her labour supply on the relative after-tax rewards. This result is due to 
the substitution effect,  that is, the increase of the share of income tax on income 
reduces the net wage making labor less attractive. Comparing the public and 
private expenditure, the results show that they follow the same pattern. Only in 
scenario 5 they become negative. This means that the crowding out effect on 
private expenditure only appears at a certain high level of taxation and for income 
taxation. This result suggests that the choice of the tax instruments matters to 
avoid the crowding out effect, and not only the taxation amount.  
 
Table 5. Macroeconomic effects of raising public infrastructure investments                            
in the EU-15 and EFTA countries (change from benchmark scenario) 
 
Scenario 1 
Investment 
in 2010 
 
 
 
Scenario 2 
Investment 
and 
consumption 
taxation in 
2010 
Scenario 3 
Investment 
and 
consumption 
taxation in 
2050 
Scenario 4 
Investment 
and income 
taxation in 
2010 
Scenario 5 
Investment 
and income 
taxation in 
2050 
GDP (%) 0.048 0.024 -0.038 -0.584 -3.110 
Employment (%) 0 0 0 0 -5.806 
Private expenditure (%) 0.298 1.245 3.367 0.192 -3.362 
Government expenditure (%) 0.453 1.273 3.111 0.355 -2.929 
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EU-15 and EFTA countries gain from additional public investment, except in 
scenario 5 (Table 6). Additional infrastructure investment can be beneficial, but 
welfare can be adversely affected again due jointly to the large increase in 
taxation and the selected tax structure. Decomposing the welfare change in its 
components, change in welfare is due to the allocative and trade effects in 
Scenario 1 and 2. The contribution to welfare change of allocative effects 
becomes negative in the long run (Scenario 3 and 5). If income taxation is applied 
(scenario 4 and 5), the welfare change is due also to the endowments change from 
one sector to another for scenario 4, and also to the change of labour supply in 
scenario 5.  Comparing the consumption and income scenarios, the main finding 
is that income taxation is sub-optimal and that redistribution of the investment 
cost should be achieved with consumption taxation. This result is opposite to that 
in Saez (2004), that shows that direct income taxation should be preferred to 
indirect tax instruments, such as consumption taxation. The contrast in the results 
is due to the general equilibrium effects.  
 
At international level, the effects slightly differ amongst scenarios. In terms of 
trade, Table 7 shows that additional investment generates negative trade balance 
change in scenario 1. In fact, the EU-15 and EFTA countries increase imports, in 
particular, of manufacturing goods and market services. The other countries gain 
in terms of trade, except EU-12. This latter region increases the imports of market 
services from USA and Japan rather than from the EU-15 and EFTA countries. 
Moreover, it follows that USA and Japan benefit substantially in terms of trade 
due to the increase in the exports of manufacturing goods and market services. 
Also China and South-East Asia gain in terms of trade. China mainly increases the 
export of manufacturing goods, whereas South-East Asia also increases the 
exports of market services.  Table 8 reports the effects on GDP. The EU-12 
countries gain in terms of GDP, except if income taxation is applied in 2050. 
China gains in terms of GDP in any scenario, Japan gains only if income taxation 
is applied in 2050. In Scenario 1 and 2 the investment in European transport 
infrastructure increases global welfare (Table 9). In Scenario 3 global welfare 
change become negative. In Scenario 4 and 5 no country gains. 
 
Table 6. Welfare contributions  (Millions $ change, w.r.t. benchmark scenario) 
 
Welfare  
Change 
 
 
Contribution to 
welfare change of 
allocative 
effects  
 
Contribution to 
welfare change 
of endowments 
change  
Contribution to 
welfare change 
of trade effects 
  
Scenario 1 Investment in 
2010 11512 5402 0 6231 
Scenario 2 
Investment and consumption 
taxation in 2010 8959 2652 0 6406 
Scenario 3 
Investment and consumption 
taxation in 2050 2117 -4290 0 6794 
Scenario 4 
Investment and income 
taxation in 2010 -58701 -306 -65704 7413 
Scenario 5 
Investment and income 
taxation in 2050 -339332 -28986 -335187 12344 
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Table 7. Trade balance ($ Millions change w.r.t. benchmark scenario 2010) 
 
Scenario 1 
Investment 
in 2010 
 
Scenario 2 
Investment 
and commodity 
taxation in 2010 
Scenario 3 
Investment in 2010 
and commodity 
taxation in 2050 
Scenario 4 
Investment 
and income 
taxation in 2010 
Scenario 5 
Investment in 2010 
and income 
taxation in 2050 
USA 9148 9150 9154 9186 9339 
CAN 1289 1286 1281 1275 1220 
EU-15 and EFTA -41359 -41383 -41436 -41509 -42111 
JPK 12889 12843 12742 12658 11735 
ANZ 898 899 901 905 931 
EU-12 -176 -175 -172 -170 -148 
FSU 1219 1232 1261 1289 1569 
MDE 1183 1230 1336 1422 2383 
CAM 798 799 801 802 819 
SAM 2853 2858 2870 2877 2971 
SAS 1479 1476 1470 1468 1426 
SEA 3954 3949 3938 3925 3810 
CHI 4790 4781 4763 4739 4538 
NAF 389 396 412 431 602 
SSA 360 368 386 401 567 
ROW 288 289 293 300 349 
 
Table 8. GDP (% change w.r.t. benchmark scenario 2010) 
 
Scenario 1 
Investment 
in 2010 
 
Scenario 2 
Investment 
and commodity 
taxation in 2010 
Scenario 3 
Investment in 2010 
and commodity 
taxation in 2050 
Scenario 4 
Investment 
and income 
taxation in 2010 
Scenario 5 
Investment in 2010 
and income 
taxation in 2050 
USA -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
CAN -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.026 
EU-15 and EFTA 0.048 0.024 -0.038 -0.584 -3.110 
JPK -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.002 
ANZ -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.012 
EU-12 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.002 -0.017 
FSU -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 -0.012 -0.025 
MDE -0.013 -0.014 -0.016 -0.018 -0.038 
CAM -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.013 
SAM -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.020 
SAS -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 
SEA -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
CHI 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 
NAF -0.017 -0.019 -0.022 -0.027 -0.064 
SSA -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 -0.024 
ROW -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.011 
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Table 9. Welfare change (millions $ w.r.t. benchmark scenario 2010) 
 
Scenario 1 
Investment 
in 2010 
 
Scenario 2 
Investment 
and commodity 
taxation in 2010 
Scenario 3 
Investment in 2010 
and commodity 
taxation in 2050 
Scenario 4 
Investment 
and income 
taxation in 2010 
Scenario 5 
Investment in 2010 
and income 
taxation in 2050 
USA -1224 -1240 -1275 -1458 -2396 
CAN -399 -405 -418 -432 -560 
EU-15 and EFTA 11512 8959 2117 -58701 -339332 
JPK -1800 -1773 -1714 -1701 -1301 
ANZ -233 -237 -245 -263 -380 
EU-12 44 28 -8 -67 -516 
FSU -392 -424 -497 -548 -1171 
MDE -649 -732 -917 -1021 -2514 
CAM -174 -181 -198 -213 -372 
SAM -970 -990 -1033 -1071 -1472 
SAS -251 -248 -243 -249 -241 
SEA -424 -438 -471 -516 -885 
CHI -542 -547 -557 -563 -647 
NAF -181 -205 -260 -304 -798 
SSA -106 -129 -180 -218 -666 
ROW -85 -89 -99 -118 -249 
World 4126 1348 -5998 -67442 -353500 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper is a first attempt to discuss the macroeconomic and redistributive 
effects of public  investment coupled with an exogenous taxation system in the 
European Union. A multi-country, multi-region CGE model, called GTAP-CTI, 
has been applied. Public investment for transport infrastructure in the EU has been 
taken as case study.  Two sets of scenarios have been simulated. The first set 
compares the application of consumption and income taxation to face the increase 
of the public investment expenditure. The second set of scenarios compares the 
application of taxation in the short and long run facing the question of 
redistribution of the public investment spending.  
The framework employed in the paper is highly specialized and the results may 
not hold generally, but they mark relevant policy recommendations. Income 
taxation has strong negative effects on GDP, employment and welfare. 
Consumption taxation may have also negative effects, but the redistributive 
effects in the long run are less negative than income taxation. The other countries 
gain in terms of trade, but they suffer welfare loss. Thus, differently to the results 
in literature, in a general equilibrium context, consumption taxation may be better 
than income taxation.  Furthermore, policy makers must take into account that the 
choice of tax structure matters to avoid the crowding out effect on private 
expenditure and welfare loss.  
However, these findings must be considered as preliminary results and merit to 
be further analyzed. In particular, this work calls for three potential future 
research lines. Firstly, analysis of the  effects of increased productivity coupled 
with exogenous taxation due to additional infrastructure investment. Secondly, 
comparative analysis of public investment and taxation in countries with different 
social, economic and environmental context, such as between developing and 
developed countries. Finally,  application of a dynamic CGE model to discuss 
14 
rigorously the intergenerational redistribution effects due to public investment 
under different tax structure.   
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